Abstract. Recently, multicast has seen only marginal wide-scale deployment. One of the main reasons is the lack of support for security and tra c management. Although there has been some recent work, these e orts have not emphasized the critical need to deploy security features side-by-side with management solutions. In this paper, we propose MAFIA, a multicast management solution with the speci c aim of strengthening multicast security through multicast access control, multicast tra c ltering, and DoS attack prevention. MAFIA achieves these tasks by making use of information about multicast group memberships available at di erent locations in a network. We have designed various deployment solutions for MAFIA. Among these various solutions, a variety of factors need to be considered. In particular, a solution should have the capability to handle high tra c rates, be easy to deploy, and be exible in terms of functionality. We also implement one such solution using the GNU/Linux operating system.
Introduction
Although IP multicast is an e cient technology for the delivery of multimedia, only a small percentage of end users receive multimedia through multicast streams. This has mainly to do with the lack of global deployment of multicast. Several reasons have been cited for slowing deployment, chief among them being concerns with multicast security and multicast management 1].
The need for security solutions has only now received attention from the engineering and research communities 2]. The need for management solutions has not received enough attention 3] 1] in spite of multicast management solutions being important to enterprises for purposes of multicast access control and tra c management. Multicast access control is needed so that network operators can control multicast access on a per host and per multicast group/source basis. For example, in an enterprise it may make sense to allow only some privileged hosts to send and receive tra c from a multicast group, whereas all other hosts are restricted to only receiving tra c from that group. Multicast tra c management is important for reasons of e cient bandwidth utilization, quality of service, pricing, and security. At the very least, malicious multicast packets owing into an enterprise should be ltered.
In fact, the lack of multicast management makes it easy to exploit vulnerabilities in multicast protocols. For example, consider the recent denial of service (DoS) attack that occured in January 2003 because of the Sapphire worm (also known as Slammer) 4]. This worm overloaded core routers that ran the Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP) with excess state causing them to perform poorly. Part of the cause of this attack is the unscalable nature of MSDP. Another reason behind the denial of service attack is that it originated from \rogue" hosts whose membership to bogus multicast groups could not be controlled because of the lack of multicast management solutions.
Some solutions have been proposed for multicast access control and multicast tra c ltering. Research has been done to control multicast access through encryption and the selective distribution of the keys used to encrypt group information 5] 6]. However, most of this work relies on complex cooperation between the participants of a multicast group and function at layers above the network layer. Moreover, such solutions are still to be deployed and are not applicable in cases where cooperation between participants is not possible or not needed. For example, a \community Internet radio" server that streams its contents using multicast need not be concerned about the identities of its listeners. In the case of multicast tra c ltering, we are not aware of any rewall that natively supports it. In 7] , the authors adopt a proxy based approach in their rewall to unicast multicast datagrams to end receivers to avoid the ltering of multicast tra c at the rewall. However, their approach does not scale well for two reasons. First, it relies on unicast delivery of packets in the enterprise. Second, it also requires changes to host software. In reality, most rewalls drop UDP packets. This also blocks multicast tra c because multicast datagrams are delivered using UDP. To allow multicast tra c through rewalls, tunnelling techniques 8] 9] have been proposed to tunnel multicast datagrams through rewalls. However, these techniques do not address the real issue, which is to ensure that harmful multicast tra c does not enter or leave the protected enclave.
For the quicker adoption of multicast, multicast management solutions are needed that can 1) control multicast group membership, 2) lter multicast tra c owing in and out of the enterprise, and 3) prevent multicast denial of service attacks using multicast access control as a prevention technique. In this paper, we propose such a multicast management solution called MAFIA. There are two main challenges in the design of MAFIA. First, MAFIA needs to accommodate the \open" IP service model that multicast is based on. In such a model, the identities of end hosts are not maintained for achieving scalability in multicast protocols. However, the identity of a host is needed to control its membership to a multicast group. Second, MAFIA should be deployed such that it intrudes as little as possible on the normal operation of the network. By this we mean that end hosts should not be aware of the existence of such a solution and therefore need not co-operate with MAFIA for it to function. Also routers should undergo little change to support MAFIA. An ideal multicast management solution is one that can be deployed with no changes to routing software. Accommodating such a goal comes with some tradeo s. We discuss these tradeo s when evaluating the deployment options for MAFIA against a number of factors such as ease of deployment, exibility in terms of functionality, and routing state overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss in detail why solutions aimed speci cally at securing multicast need to be complemented by the multicast management. Section 3 presents the requirements for MAFIA. In Section 4, we propose the MAFIA architecture and discuss various options for deploying the architecture. In Section 5, we evaluate the deployment options and discuss our implementation of MAFIA for the GNU/Linux operating system. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
Multicast Security and Multicast Management
This section describes in detail why solutions to manage multicast need to be deployed side-by-side with security-speci c solutions to better achieve multicast security. We start rst by broadly classifying multicast security as:
1. the prevention of Data Attacks | the protection of data exchanged between hosts. 2. the prevention of Control Attacks | the protection of control information exchanged between multicast routing entities. Such attacks target the multicast routing state stored in routers. Data protection, which involves ensuring the con dentiality and integrity of data, can be achieved using encryption. However, in the absence of access control, encryption alone cannot prevent a multicast receiver from joining an encrypted transmission to simply waste bandwidth (edge-receiver attack) or to record the encrypted tra c. If the tra c is in fact recorded, it could be decrypted in nonrealtime by leveraging easily available computing power. This compromises data con dentiality. Furthermore, in the absence of access control, encryption cannot prevent a malicious host from sending bogus packets in order to interfere with the successful delivery of group tra c to other receivers (edge-sender attack). For example, suppose some participants in a multicast group are in a video conference. A malicious participant or outsider can transmit bogus tra c to this group and garble the legitimate tra c in the group. Therefore, host access control needs to be used along with techniques such as encryption to protect data.
Protection of control information can be partially achieved by the use of encryption technologies such as IP- Sec 10] . With encryption, routing entities exchange control information over a secure channel, making it impossible for a potentially malicious routing entity to in uence the global routing state by injecting bogus state. However, just the encryption of control tra c does not prevent denial of service attacks against routing entities. For example, a receiver by subscribing to a large number of multicast groups can waste bandwidth and overload routers with the excess PIM forwarding state. As another example, consider attacks launched by the RAMEN or the Sapphire worms. These attacks launched from end hosts resulted in routers becoming overloaded with large amounts of bogus MSDP state. Therefore, just the encryption of control tra c is not su cient to prevent such attacks, as these attacks were launched from end hosts whose access to multicast could not be controlled.
Even if multicast access control can be achieved, a sometimes overlooked problem is that UDP, is the cause of some security breaches and is often blocked 7] . Blocking of UDP tra c may be too stringent a requirement for enterprises, where the potential savings with the use of multicast far outweigh the threat, if any, with its use. Two solutions to minimize the threat with UDP are:
{ Limiting the use of multicast to only trusted hosts and groups. This can be done by controlling access with the use of multicast security policies. A multicast security policy de nes which groups and hosts are considered safe.
{ Filtering tra c owing into the enterprise using state gathered from multicast routing protocols in conjunction with the multicast security policies Clearly, it follows from the above discussion that management of multicast in an enterprise through access control and the multicast tra c ltering is needed along with security speci c solutions to improve the overall security of a multicast deployment.
MAFIA Requirements
In this section, we discuss the requirements from MAFIA in detail. First, we outline them below:
1. Multicast Access Control: Enterprises need mechanisms for controlling multicast access for purposes of security and resource management. 
Multicast Access Control
Multicast access control can be broadly classi ed as host access control and designated router access control. Host access control controls which host can be a member of a certain multicast group. For host access control, exact host-to-group associations are needed. Controlling the membership behavior of a group of hosts on a subnet to subnet basis is achieved through designated router access control. For designated router access control, designated-router-to-group associations are needed. Host-to-group associations and designated-router-to-group associations are available at the Last Hop Control Point and the Central Control Point. These points are shown in Fig. 1 .
The two access control functions are further de ned below:
{ Host Access Control: Since a host can be either a sender or receiver in a multicast group, host access control can be of two types: 1. Receiver access control: With receiver access control, the reception of multicast tra c on a per (S,G), and per host basis can be controlled. Receiver access control can be very useful in bandwidth control and the prevention of edge-receiver DoS attacks 11]. 2. Source Access Control: Source access control can be used to control a source's behavior on a per group and per host basis. It can be very useful in the prevention of edge-sender DoS attacks 11].
{ Designated-Router Access Control: Designated-Router access control controls multicast access at the granularity of subnets. Having designated router access control is useful in the following cases: 1. The last hop control points lie in a di erent administrative domain. In this case end host associations cannot be controlled. 2. Host access control is not implemented or not necessary on the last hop. For example, all hosts on the last hop may have similar privileges, therefore not needing individual host control. 3. To prevent denial of service attacks launched from di erent subnets.
Suppose that several hosts present in di erent subnets subscribe to some groups that stream very high bandwidth tra c, with the result that the cumulative e ect of these subscriptions leads to congestion of core paths in the network. At the granularity of each last hop control point, the attack would not be detectable. To detect such attacks, a global view of the entire network is needed, which can be obtained by looking at designated router membership behavior. Since designated routers act on behalf of receivers and sources, the two resulting access control types are: Proxy-Receiver Access Control and ProxySource Access Control. With proxy-receiver access control, the reception of multicast tra c on a per (S,G), and per subnet basis can be controlled. With proxy-source access control, noti cations of new sources sent by designated routers to the local rendezvous point (RP) can be controlled. As source noti cations are not used in SSM, proxy-source access control is used only in case of ASM.
Packet Filtering
UDP unicast and multicast tra c is generally blocked by network administrators. One of the reasons is that UDP's connectionless nature can be exploited for performing \port-spoo ng" attacks. For example, suppose a host whose regular IP address is 10.1.2.10 joins the multicast group 224.2.197.230 on ports 5001, 5002. Furthermore, suppose that the host provides NFS services on port 2049. If a multicast participant or other outsider sends a malicious packet to 224.2.197.230 on port 2049, the host's kernel will deliver that packet to the host's NFS service, just as if the packet had been addressed to 10.1.2.10, the host's regular IP address. This problem is not speci c only to multicast communication. It applies to unicast as well. In 7] , the authors propose a proxy based system with UDP port negotiation to unicast packets only to unused ports on an internal host. The solution although novel, does not scale well as it relies on unicast delivery of packets.
In the above example, malicious UDP packets are delivered to a victim's NFS service because in ASM any source can transmit tra c to a group. However, if only legitimate sources are selected, the risk of malicious UDP packets can be minimized. Source selection in ASM is not easy as it is not supported as part of its design. On the other hand, SSM supports the selection of sources and is therefore better. In SSM, any application can take advantage of the semantical information available to select a legitimate source. Since SSM is being positioned to replace ASM 12] , most of these kinds of threats will eventually be eliminated.
In SSM, even if an application selects a malicious source, the intended malice is limited only to hosts that receive the data. With developments such as IGMP snooping 13] at the edge of the network, the visibility of such data is limited only to hosts that subscribe to that source. Moreover, attacks as described above, are not easily realized, as applications, especially services, make explicit checks to validate the integrity of data they receive. Even if such an attack is launched, rewalls that rely on multicast routing state and multicast policies to lter packets, would never let the attack leak into the protected enclave. Given the arguments made above and the scalability problems with unicast delivery of datagrams, we believe that multicast delivery of packets in the internal network is not only e cient but can be made secure. The assumption, and the goal of MAFIA, is to detect and lter malicious multicast packets. Packet ltering needs to be done in the context of state gathered from managing group memberships along with multicast policies. For the above example, prior knowl-edge exists that all multicast packets from the group 224.2.197.230 are addressed either to port numbers 5001 or 5002. This can be captured in the multicast policy. Therefore, the malicious packet addressed to destination port number 2049 would never reach the NFS service on host 10.1.2.10 as it would be dropped by the packet lter.
Prevention of Multicast DoS Attacks
Multicast protocols are vulnerable to DoS attacks. Some attacks result from awed protocol implementations 14]. However, most of the easily exploitable problems are due to poor protocol speci cations. For example, the Multicast Source Discovery Protocol (MSDP) has several weaknesses. MSDP is a protocol used to advertise the actively transmitting multicast sources across all domains in the multicast infrastructure. It exchanges availability information using a ooding mechanism that makes MSDP inherently unscalable by design. Attacks by the RAMEN worm and the more recent Sapphire worm, are examples of how MSDP's ooding mechanism can be exploited 2].
Another class of DoS attacks worth considering is those based on the Internet Group Membership Protocol (IGMP). It is extremely easy for an end-host to subscribe to a large number of multicast groups and cause the internal network to be ooded with unwanted tra c. Another consequence of such a ooding attack is the overloading of PIM routers because of the large amount of PIM state created for delivering the unwanted tra c.
Router vendors provide rate control mechanisms to prevent such attacks. However, their e ectiveness in real world deployments has been found to be limited. We can claim this because these mechanisms, deployed after the RAMEN attack took place in January 2001, were not e ective in preventing the Sapphire worm attack that took place in January 2003. The problem with DoS attacks can be most e ectively solved in a two-fold manner. One is to limit the use of multicast to only trusted hosts and groups. This can prevent internally launched IGMP and MSDP DoS attacks. The second approach is lter bogus packets that result from DoS attacks launched from external networks. For instance, MSDP attacks launched from external networks can be prevented by ltering bogus MSDP SAs.
MAFIA Architecture
From our discussion of the MAFIA requirements in Section 4, it follows that two separate functional modules are needed: one to lter UDP packets (requirement 1) and the other to control multicast access(requirement 2). We call the two modules the MAFIA Packet Filter and the MAFIA Access Controller respectively. The Packet Filter is co-located with the protected enclave's rewall at a central control point (see Fig. 1 ). The access controller, on the other hand, is situated in the interior of the protected enclave. Requirement 3 from MAFIA is necessary to prevent three types of DoS attacks: MSDP, IGMP and PIM attacks.
IGMP edge-sender and edge-receiver attacks are prevented by the MAFIA access controller. Its detailed operation is explained later in this section. PIM DoS attacks are prevented as a consequence of preventing IGMP edge-receiver and edge-sender attacks. In addition, preventing an IGMP edge-sender attack will also prevent the launch of MSDP DoS attacks from the inside of the protected enclave. This is because containing the number of groups a sender can transmit tra c to will automatically limit the number of MSDP SA messages generated by the local RP. However, externally launched MSDP attacks can still a ect the MSDP peer in the protected enclave if the in ux of bogus SAs from the outside is not prevented. Since, the MAFIA Packet Filter is co-located with a rewall, bogus SAs will traverse through the packet lter. Therefore, the ltering of these SAs is also done by the MAFIA packet lter. Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual view of the MAFIA architecture. It shows a third module, the MAFIA policy server. The policy server maintains the multicast policy. For example, a multicast policy may restrict multicast access to only selected hosts located in certain subnets in the enterprise. Updates to the policy are always done at the policy server. The updates are then mirrored at the access controller and the packet lter to reduce the latency involved in serving an access request. This rest of this section discusses the architecture of the MAFIA access controller and the MAFIA packet lter in detail. We consider the MAFIA access controller rst. The access controller can be deployed in more than one way. Therefore, in addition to discussing the basic operation of the access controller, we also present various ways the access controller can be deployed.
MAFIA Access Controller
The MAFIA access controller implements the four types of access control discussed in Section 4.1. For host access control, host-to-group associations need to be known. These are available only at the last hop control points. On the other hand, for designated router access control, designated-router-to-group associations need to be known. This information is available at the centralized control point. As these two types of associations are available at two distinct locations in the network hierarchy, the MAFIA access controller is composed of two separate modules present at each of these two locations. We call these modules the MAFIA Last Hop Control Point (MLHCP) and the MAFIA Centralized Control Point (MCCP). Figure 3 illustrates the placement of the MLHCP and MCCP in a network. Although, the MAFIA Access Controller is made up of the ML-HCP and the MCCP, their architecture details are discussed separately. This is because both modules function independent of each other and as a result do not a ect each other's operation in any way. sender access control. IGMP membership reports are used to implement receiver access control. When the MLHCP receives an IGMP report, it uses the locally cached multicast policy to decide if the requested access is permitted. Sender access control is implemented di erently. This is because a multicast sender can send tra c to a group without ever joining the group. Therefore, the arrival of a multicast datagram and not an IGMP report is the trigger to check if the transmission is permitted. The MLHCP can be deployed either actively or passively, depending on whether the MLHCP is also a routing entity. The MLHCP deployed with the designated router is an active MLHCP, as it performs routing functions. Router vendors provide support for host access control at the designated router through static ACLs (access control lists). However, the exibility o ered by this is limited as complex tasks such as inspecting packet payloads or maintaining state between multiple packets generally cannot be done on routers. Figure 4 illustrates the passive solution. Here, the designated router ignores (using ACLs) IGMP reports received from all hosts except ones received from the designated host | a dual network interface host that acts as a proxy for all other hosts in the subnet. Interface a of the designated host listens to all IGMP reports generated on the last hop subnet. Receiver access control is implemented using this interface. Interface b receives all PIM Register messages generated by the designated router. This interface is used to implement sender access control. When a host sends an IGMP membership report expressing interest in receiving tra c from a group, the report is received by the designated router and the designated host. As the designated router is con gured to ignore all reports except ones from the designated host, it ignore the report. When the designated host receives the membership report, it checks if the host is permitted to perform the requested operation. If the requested operation is permitted, the designated host in turn generates a membership report with the same information as contained in the original report. Since this report is generated by the designated host, the designated router now accepts it and initiates the creation of the distribution tree. Even though the designated host generated the membership report, the delivery of multicast datagrams to receivers is not a ected in any way. This is because a designated router always broadcasts multicast datagrams on the last hop network following the rules speci ed in RFC 1112 15] . This means that a receiver will eventually receive the packets from the group in which it is interested.
For sender access control, as the MLHCP receives all PIM register messages, it checks whether the operation is permitted by the policy. If the PIM register message is not permitted, the MLHCP simply drops the message. An alternate con guration for this interface is to operate in snooping mode where the interface listens only to the PIM register messages. When the MLHCP functions in snooping mode, it cannot stop the message from reaching the upstream RP. Therefore, to counteract the e ect of the PIM register message, the MLHCP originates a PIM unregister message towards the designated router as if it was created by the RP. The MLHCP derives the identity of the RP from the PIM register message itself. When the designated router receives the PIM unregister message, it ignores any PIM register messages that the RP may generate. Therefore it does not forward any data towards the RP. The disadvantage with the snooping con guration is that the MLHCP cannot prevent unauthorized PIM register messages from reaching the RP. Therefore, if a host randomly sends data to a multitude of multicast groups, like in a RAMEN worm attack, a large number of PIM register messages will reach the RP, resulting in a MSDP SA ood.
MAFIA Centralized Control Point. The MCCP performs designated-router access control. The MCCP implements proxy-receiver access control by ltering PIM Join messages. The proxy-sender access control is implemented by ltering PIM Register messages. In discussing the deployment considerations for the MCCP, it helps to classify the MCCP based on the role it plays in multicast routing as: { Active MCCP: An active MCCP is also a multicast routing entity and therefore takes part in the creation and maintenance of distribution trees. Figure 5 shows one possible deployment solution where the MCCP is implemented in a multicast router. Router vendors already provide some support for controlling designated router behavior by way of access control lists (ACLs). However, the exibility o ered by such a solution is limited. For instance, certain signature-based attack detection techniques 2] require that state be maintained between packets. Such exibility is not o ered by ACLs. { Passive MCCP: A passive MCCP is not a multicast routing entity. However, it receives every protocol message destined for upstream routers. Since a passive MCCP is not responsible for any routing function, it can be a dedicated system that performs complex tasks such as inspecting packet payloads, maintaining state between multiple packets, detecting attack signatures, and packet monitoring. Figure 6 illustrates a passive MCCP deployment. Here, packets are ltered before they reach upstream routers. An alternate deployment solution is to deploy the passive MCCP in snooping mode. In snooping mode, the MCCP cannot lter packets. Therefore, it reacts to an unauthorized request by sending a protocol message that counteracts the request. So, for PIM Join messages, the snooping MCCP will send a PIM Prune message towards an upstream PIM router. For a PIM Register message, the snooping MCCP will send a PIM Unregister message towards the designated router that sent the register message. A snooping MCCP is not completely e ective in preventing PIM ooding attacks. This is because with a snooping MCCP, PIM protocol messages for unauthorized requests reach upstream routers. Upstream routers then create state for these requests temporarily until such time they receive PIM messages from the MCCP that releases this state. However, if a large number of unauthorized requests are sent in a short period of time, PIM routers will get overloaded, albeit temporarily, with large amounts of state. { UDP Filtering: UDP ltering is simple UDP ow screening to ensure that UDP packets that ow through the rewall match certain criteria. If the UDP packets do not match the given criteria, they are dropped. The criteria for UDP packet ltering is speci ed as part of the multicast policy. The simplest criteria is to ensure a multicast datagram in an incoming or an outgoing stream carries a destination multicast address that corresponds to some \live" multicast distribution tree. MAFIA keeps track of \live" trees by tracking PIM Join messages and corresponding PIM Prune messages. In the normal case, multicast routers generally never forward packets that do not belong in a distribution tree. However, experience tells us that malfunctioning routers erroneously forward such packets. This simple criteria will ensure that bogus packets are dropped. More complex criteria are also used to lter packets. For instance, datagrams are ltered based on the destination port address they carry. As an example, multicast datagrams addressed to all \well-known" ports can be ltered. Such a criteria can be e ective in preventing UDP port spoo ng attacks. Signature based schemes can also be applied to lter UDP packets from attacks with unique signatures.
{ MSDP-SA Filtering: MSDP SA ltering is done by looking up the multicast policy and determining which multicast groups are permitted by the policy. Only SAs for \joinable" groups are let through the rewall and the remaining are dropped. As with UDP ltering, signature based schemes can be used to lter MSDP SAs. For instance, the RAMEN worm has a unique signature pattern of a large number of SAs with increasing class D addresses originating from the same source. Other SA ltering schemes proposed in 2] can also be applied for more e ective ltering.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the MAFIA architecture discussed in Section 5.
Our goal is to evaluate the architectures against various evaluation metrics. These evaluation metrics are discussed later in this section. First, we present the methodology used in our evaluations.
Methodology
The performance of MAFIA depends on a number of factors:
{ MAFIA System Con guration: Performance of MAFIA ultimately depends on its hardware and software con guration. Factors include processor speed, amount of memory available, network card capabilities, and operating system used.
{ Multicast Group Characteristics: Characteristics such as number of groups, sources, and receivers.
{ Tra c Characteristics: The tra c characteristics depend on the group characteristics and the rate at which each multicast source transmits.
{ Multicast Policy: If the multicast policy is complex and restrictive in terms of allowing multicast access, the load on MAFIA is greater.
{ Link Bandwidth: Link bandwidth may be low enough for MAFIA to operate e ectively even under maximum bandwidth utilization. On the other hand, MAFIA may not be able to handle high bandwidth tra c. We considered evaluating MAFIA through simulations. However, trying to accommodate the above factors in a simulation environment would be di cult and the results would not lead us to any particularly non-obvious conclusions. Therefore, instead of presenting empirical results, we instead focus on an evaluation of the various ways MAFIA can be deployed. To this end, we limit our evaluations only to the MAFIA access controller. This is because the access controller, which is composed of the MLHCP and the MCCP, can be deployed in more than one way and each deployment option o ers some interesting tradeo s. On the other hand, the MAFIA Packet Filter can be deployed in only one way.
Evaluation Criteria
We use the following criteria for our evaluations: { Ease of deployment: We evaluate the ease with which the various architectures can be deployed.
{ Flexibility: We evaluate the exibility o ered by an architecture in terms of the range of features (functionality) an architecture can support.
{ Tra c Rates: Here, we evaluate an architecture's capability to handle high tra c rates.
{ Routing state: The routing state maintained by routers varies from architecture to architecture. Ideally, routing state should not be maintained for unauthorized requests. We evaluate the extent of routing state maintained by routers for unauthorized requests.
Evaluation Results
MLHCP. We evaluated the active and passive MLHCP deployment options discussed in Section 5.1. The passive MLHCP is easier to deploy as it is deployed on a dedicated system and therefore requires no changes to router software. Furthermore, deployment can be easily done using \o -the-shelf" commodity hardware and software. The active MLHCP, on the other hand, is deployed on the router, which means that the router software needs to change to support the MLHCP. The passive MLHCP also o ers more exibility than an active MLHCP. This is because the passive MLHCP does not perform any routing functions, which means that it can perform more complex tasks such as maintaining state between multiple packets, packet logging, and tra c analysis.
However, a passive MLHCP cannot easily handle very high tra c rates of the order of gigabits per second. This is because commodity hardware and software cannot easily scale to higher tra c rates. To overcome this problem, in 16], the authors propose a tra c splitting architecture to scale commodity hardware and software for high tra c rates. The problem with this, as the authors themselves acknowledge, is that such an architecture is di cult to implement as it requires sophisticated extensions to systems. However, the active MLHCP can handle high tra c rates because the tra c rate the MLHCP handles after all depends on the capability of the router itself.
With respect to routing state maintained at the designated router, the active MLHCP results in no state being maintained for unauthorized requests. This is because an active MLHCP lters an access request before it reaches the designated router. This means that for unauthorized requests, routers would never receive the request and consequently no state would be maintained. With the passive MLHCP, an unauthorized request reaches the designated router that results in state being created for this unauthorized request. The unauthorized PIM protocol message created by the designated router then gets ltered by the passive MLHCP.
In summary, the passive MLHCP is a more exible architecture and is easier to deploy. However, the passive MLHCP cannot handle high tra c rates easily and results in more state being maintained at the designated router as compared to the active MLHCP.
MCCP. As with the passive MLHCP, the passive MCCP is more exible and is easier to deploy. However, unlike the passive MLHCP, the passive MCCP does not result in state being maintained at upstream routers for unauthorized requests. This is because all PIM messages are screened before they reach upstream routers.
The problem with high tra c rates is more serious at the passive MCCP. This is because the passive MCCP now has to screen requests coming from several last hop subnets. Consequently, the passive MCCP can easily become overloaded even at moderate link usage. Tra c splitting 16] could be used to alleviate the problem with high tra c rates. However, this adds complexity to the system. In summary, the passive MCCP is easier to deploy, more exible and maintains no more state than what results from an active MCCP. On the other hand, the active MCCP will perform better at higher tra c rates as it is deployed on a router.
Implementation
We have chosen to implement MAFIA as a combination of the passive MLHCP and the passive MCCP. Both architectures o er better exibility than the active solutions. Moreover, they can be deployed with no changes to router software. This means that the implementation of MAFIA is not tied to any one router vendor's product. Besides making MAFIA easier to deploy, we believe making MAFIA available as an open-source, vendor independent solution will help towards the deployment of multicast.
The MLHCP and the MCCP have been implemented on the GNU/Linux operating system using the net lter and iptables frameworks 1 . Using these frameworks, GNU/Linux o ers a comprehensive packet ltering capability that is open-source, well tested, and widely deployed. Net lter uses Net lter Matches implemented as loadable kernel modules (LKMs) to help with ltering packets. For MAFIA, we implemented two new net lter matches called the MSDP match and the PIM match. The PIM match is used to lter PIM Register and PIM Join messages. The MSDP match is used to lter MSDP Source Active messages. The MAFIA packet lter uses the MSDP match and the UDP match already existing in net lter to do MSDP and UDP packet ltering. The PIM match is used by the MCCP and the MLHCP. The MCCP uses the PIM match to lter PIM messages before they reach upstream routers. The MLHCP uses the PIM match to lter PIM messages originated by the designated router. In addition to the PIM match, the MLHCP also uses the IP match module to lter IGMP reports on the last hop. For authorized requests the MLHCP uses the libnet 2 packet-generation tool to generate IGMP reports.
We tested our implementation of MAFIA using a GNU/Linux system with the MSDP, PIM, and UDP net lter extensions installed. We used a packet generating tool written using libnet and libpcap 3 to generate our test tra c. The packet generator uses information in its con guration le to randomly send a mixture of UDP, PIM Join, PIM Register, and MSDP SA packets to the Linux system. We used a restrictive multicast policy to create the appropriate net lter rules on the GNU/Linux system. All packets sent by the packet generator that do not match the net lter rules are dropped. This test con rms the correct operation of our MAFIA implementation.
Conclusions
The lack of multicast management adversely a ects multicast security. A testament to this fact is the increase in the number of denial of service attacks against multicast that have occurred in the absence of multicast management. Moreover, multicast management enables network administrators to manage their multicast deployments for purposes of administrative control and e cient resource utilization.
In this paper, we have proposed MAFIA, a multicast management solution that addresses three requirements: multicast access control, multicast data and control packet ltering, and denial of service attack prevention. We have looked at various ways MAFIA can be deployed. In addition, we have evaluated each deployment option against various factors such as ease of deployment, exibility, routing state overhead, and its capability to handle high tra c rates. As a result, network designers need to consider the tradeo s associated with each deployment option before deploying MAFIA in the network. We have implemented MAFIA using the net lter architecture in the GNU/Linux operating system. We plan to o er the net lter extensions written for our implementation in an upcoming release of net lter.
As future work, we plan to support in MAFIA, advanced \service-administration" features such as tra c monitoring and tra c management from a quality of service perspective. MAFIA already supports the management of host memberships and the ltering of multicast tra c, which are prerequisites to support these features. Of particular interest to us is tra c management. Currently, there exist a lack of available solutions to ensure quality of service among streams that have di erent priorities. Some streams may have higher priority than others and therefore such streams should be given preference over others when bandwidth is limited. Also interesting is that the priority of a stream can be determined dynamically by considering various factors such as the number of participants in a group, the type of tra c such as peer-to-peer or real-time tra c, amount of bandwidth needed, and the wait time to prevent starvation when allotting bandwidth to a stream.
